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Abstract 
This study explored the latent structure of divergent thinking as a cognitive ability across gifted and 
non-gifted samples of students utilizing multiple-group analysis of mean and covariance structures 
(MG-MACS). Whereas Spearman’s law of diminishing returns postulates lower g saturation of cogni-
tive tests with increasing ability level and consequently, a lower correlation of cognitive abilities in 
more gifted samples, recent evidence from creativity research has shown that correlations of divergent 
thinking with intelligence are unaffected by ability level. In order to investigate this conflicting state of 
affairs with respect to divergent thinking, we utilized increasingly restrictive MG-MACS models that 
were capable of comparing latent variances, covariances, and means between gifted (IQ > 130) and 
non-gifted (IQ ≤ 130) groups of students. In a sample of 1070 German school students, we found that a 
MG-MACS model assuming partial strict measurement invariance with respect to the postulated factor 
model of verbal, figural, and numerical divergent thinking could not be rejected. Further, latent vari-
ances and covariances of latent divergent thinking factors did not significantly differ between groups, 
whereas the gifted group exhibited significantly higher latent means. Finally, implications of our results 
for future research on the latent structure of divergent thinking are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
Many structural theories of intelligence incorporate a factor corresponding to creativity 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993; Jäger, 1984). Divergent thinking (DT), which has been defined as the 
capability to generate diverse and numerous ideas (Runco, 1991), can be considered as the 
core ability for creative achievements. In a classical article, Guilford (1950) identified three 
basic components as factors of DT: Fluency (the total number of ideas generated), flexibility 
(the number of categories in the ideas) and originality (the number of unique or unusual 
ideas). However, fluency is usually described as the central component of DT (Hargreaves & 
Bolton, 1972). In contrast to research on intelligence, DT tests reported in the literature focus 
on verbal or figural content, thereby neglecting the numerical domain (Cropley, 2000). 
However, numerical content plays an important role in research on reasoning and problem-
solving, where DT is often of central importance (Mumford, Connelly, Baughman, & Marks, 
1994). Further, Livne and Milgram (2006) have shown that DT is one important facet of 
mathematical achievement. Hence, an investigation of numerical DT, and its relationship 
with verbal and figural DT, seems necessary to elucidate the factorial structure of DT. 
The concept of intellectual giftedness has been defined in different ways across the lit-
erature. Some approaches (e.g., Roznowski, Reith, & Hong, 2000) focus exclusively on high 
intellectual ability (g) as the sole determinant of intellectual giftedness, while others (e.g., 
Lubinski & Benbow, 2000) perceive giftedness as being multidimensional in nature. The 
role of creativity (and hence, DT) in models of giftedness varies as well, where some models 
of intellectual giftedness perceive creativity as a condition sine qua non for outstanding 
intellectual achievement (Renzulli, 1986), while others perceive creativity as an own form of 
giftedness (Gagné, 1993). Similar to Roznowski et al. (2000), we take a one-dimensional 
perspective on intellectual giftedness in this paper, in that subjects with a high level of fluid 
intelligence are defined as being intellectually gifted. Further, we assume that DT, as a core 
trait of creative performance, can be conceptualized as a latent cognitive ability that is part of 
a cognitive taxonomy (Carroll, 1993).  
The empirical relationship of DT with intelligence has been intensively researched over 
the years (cf. Haensly & Reynolds, 1989; Sternberg & O’Hara, 1999). Kim (2005) recently 
conducted a meta-analysis, using 21 studies with 447 correlation coefficients and 45,880 
participants overall. He found the average correlation between DT tests and intelligence to 
be r = .17. This relationship was moderated by several factors, however. For example, DT-
intelligence correlations were significantly lower for younger students compared to older 
participants. Empirically, therefore, small to moderate correlations between intelligence and 
DT have been found. 
A growing field of research pertains to the comparison of latent model structures across 
populations of varying levels of intelligence. For example, Spearman’s “law of diminishing 
returns” (Spearman, 1927) basically states that the g-saturation of cognitive ability tests 
decreases with an increase of the subject’s ability level. Conceptually, this implies a higher 
correlation of latent cognitive abilities at the lower end of the ability distribution than at the 
higher end. A large body of empirical evidence supports Spearman’s assumption (e.g., 
Hartmann & Teasdale, 2004; Reynolds & Keith, 2007). In creativity research, a conceptually 
related theory (“threshold theory”) has been proposed, which assumes that the correlation of 
intelligence with creativity is lower for subjects with higher intelligence (IQ > 120; cf. Bar-
ron, 1963). However, in the meta-analysis by Kim (2005), no support for the threshold the-Intellectual giftedness and divergent thinking  285 
ory was found. This result is in line with recent studies that were unable to find empirical 
support for the threshold theory (Preckel, Holling, & Wiese, 2006; Sligh, Conners, & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005). In fact, Sligh et al. (2005) even report an inverse threshold theory 
effect, implying a larger correlation of intelligence and creativity in the high ability group. 
The inconsistencies between empirical results pertaining to the law of diminishing re-
turns and the threshold theory are striking if DT is conceptualized as a latent ability that is 
part of a cognitive taxonomy of abilities (Carroll, 1993). However, this contradiction can 
partly be explained by the differing methodological analysis strategies between the intelli-
gence and creativity research communities. Whereas many creativity researchers utilize zero-
order correlations to analyse threshold theory, current intelligence research usually applies 
sophisticated latent variable modelling strategies that provide more thorough results. An 
important assumption for comparing observed test scores as well as correlations of latent 
abilities across groups is that measurement invariance (MI) holds. MI implies both that ob-
served test scores have the same meaning across groups and that the postulated latent model 
structure is equivalent (Gregorich, 2006; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Assessing the degree 
of MI therefore helps to decide whether differences in observed test scores are equally at-
tributable to latent abilities, or whether they are grounded in unrelated sources of variance 
(Wicherts, Dolan, & Hessen, 2005). Hence, in order to provide sound and unbiased evidence 
for either threshold theory or the law of diminishing returns, it is imperative to investigate 
MI across the compared groups. Only if MI is given can observed test scores be unequivo-
cally interpreted and correlations of latent abilities be meaningfully compared. 
Whereas MI assessments have become routine in intelligence research for the investiga-
tion of Spearman’s law of diminishing returns, creativity researchers have largely refrained 
from analysing MI with respect to threshold theory. The only study that tested MI in creativ-
ity research we are aware of was conducted by Kim, Crammond, and Bandalos (2006), but 
these authors did not compare differentially gifted groups with respect to their DT perform-
ance. A study that systematically investigates MI and compares correlations of latent abilities 
across differentially gifted groups therefore seems lacking.  
The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to compare the latent structure of verbal, 
figural, and numerical DT abilities, respectively, across levels of giftedness. Specifically, the 
main focus of this paper was an investigation of correlations of latent DT factors using MG-
MACS (multiple-group means and covariance structures) analysis. In line with the method-
ologically more sound results from intelligence research pertaining to Spearman’s law of 
diminishing returns compared to those relating to threshold theory, we hypothesized that 
correlations of latent DT abilities were lower in highly able subjects. Because it is a meth-
odological prerequisite for comparing latent correlations, we also investigated MI across 
groups. Finally, we compared latent DT means between groups, hypothesizing that only 
negligible differences would exist because of the low correlations between DT and intelli-
gence reported in the literature.  
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Method 
 
Sample 
 
The data used were a subsample from the standardization sample of the Berliner Intelli-
genzstruktur-Test für Jugendliche: Begabungs- und Hochbegabungsdiagnostik (BIS-HB 
[Berlin Structure-of-Intelligence test for Youth: Diagnosis of Talents and Giftedness]; Jäger 
et al., 2005). In this sample, a total of n = 1328 students were tested (728 males and 598 
females, two participants gave no information concerning gender). Mean age of the sample 
was 14.5 years (s = 1.1 years). A subsample (n = 1070) was additionally administered the 
short form of the German adaptation of the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (Cattell & Cattell, 
1960) in order to assess IQ. Because we wanted to compare highly gifted students to a popu-
lation with normal intelligence, we split this subsample into a gifted group (IQ > 130) and a 
non-gifted group (IQ ≤ 130). The gifted sample consisted of 250 students (mean IQ = 137, s  
= 5.2), whereas the non-gifted sample comprised 820 individuals (mean IQ = 112, s = 10.7). 
The large amount of gifted students in the sample can be explained by the fact that the BIS-
HB offers specific testnorms for gifted students. 
 
 
Measures 
 
The BIS-HB contains 12 DT tests overall, with each falling into one of three content do-
mains (verbal, figural, and numerical, respectively). Similar to the assumption of Carroll 
(1993), in the BIS model, DT is seen as a cognitive ability that represents a facet of cognitive 
functioning. Table 1 provides an overview of the 12 DT tests investigated in this study. 
 
 
Table 1:  
Description of the 12 DT tests of the BIS-HB 
 
Name Abbreviation
1 Description 
Symbol completion  ZF (F)  Drawing pictures from pre-specified objects  
Symbol combining  ZK (F)  Combination of geometric objects into different figures 
Object design  OJ (F)  Conversion of geometric figures into real objects 
Layout  LO (F)  Designing logotypes  
Specific traits  EF (V)  Listing traits a salesman should not have  
Possible object use  AM (V)  Listing uses for given objects 
Masselon  MA (V)  Building sentences as possible from three given words 
Insight Test  IT (V)  Giving explanations for a presented social situation 
Puzzles with numbers  ZR (N)  Inventing patterns of numbers according to rules 
Divergent computing  DR (N)  Finding numbers that produce a given sum 
Equations with 
numbers  
ZG (N)  Producing equations from given numbers and 
operations 
Inventing telephone 
numbers  
TN (N)  Inventing telephone numbers according to pre-specified 
rules 
Note. 
1Content domain given in brackets: F = figural, V = verbal, N = numerical. Intellectual giftedness and divergent thinking  287 
Each DT test was administered with a pre-specified time-limit and scored for fluency. 
The unadjusted intraclass-correlation-coefficient as a measure of objectivity of scoring be-
tween the ratings of two independent raters showed satisfactory values for all DT tests (M = 
.94, s = .04). The overall internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) over the twelve DT tests 
scored for fluency was found to be satisfactory (α = .84; verbal DT: α = .76; figural DT: α = 
.65; numerical DT: α = .60). 
 
 
Statistical modelling procedures 
 
Establishing MI requires fitting a sequence of nested, increasingly restricted CFA models 
(Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). MI is best assessed using MG-MACS (multiple-group analy-
sis of mean and covariance structures), because this approach allows all central aspects of MI 
to be statistically tested. The MIMIC model (multiple-indicator multiple-cause; Muthén, 
1989) can be used to assess specific aspects of MI as well, but this model assumes all factor 
loadings and residual variances to be constant across groups, an assumption that can be ex-
plicitly tested with MG-MACS. We therefore utilized MG-MACS in this study.  
Let yig denote the observed p × 1 random vector of subject i, i = 1, …, ng in group g. The 
following model for yig was specified: 
 
yig  = νg  +  Λg ηig  +  εig ,      (1) 
where νg is a p × 1 vector of measurement intercepts, Λg is a p × q matrix of factor loadings 
(q < p), ηig is a q × 1 vector of common factor scores and εig is a p × 1 vector of residuals. 
Further, the observed p × p variance-covariance matrix Σg can be decomposed as  
 
Σg = Λg Ψg Λ'g + Θg ,  (2) 
where Ψg is a q × q vector of latent factor (co-)variances, and Θg represents a diagonal p × p 
matrix of residual variances. 
In this study, several increasingly restrictive forms of MI were investigated. The relevant 
MG-MACS models were nested and therefore could be compared using likelihood-ratio 
tests. Configural MI requires equal patterns of factor loadings across groups, constraining 
construct dimensionality to be equivalent. Metric MI constrains factor loadings to be invari-
ant (Λg = Λ). A further model additionally assumes equal residual variances across groups 
(Λg = Λ, Θg = Θ). The next two models impose restrictions on the measurement intercept 
structure: Strong MI assumes factor loadings and intercepts to be invariant across groups (Λg 
= Λ, νg = ν), whereas strict MI imposes constraints on intercepts, factor loadings and residu-
als (Λg = Λ, Θg = Θ, νg = ν). Further, in order to evaluate our hypothesis pertaining to the 
equality of latent correlations across groups, we specified a sixth model that kept latent (co-) 
variances constant across groups (Λg = Λ, Θg = Θ, νg = ν, Ψg = Ψ). This model was termed 
strict MI with equal latent (co-)variances. Finally, we fitted a model that constrained the 
vector of latent factor means to be equal across groups in order to statistically test whether 
latent mean differences existed between groups (Λg = Λ, Θg = Θ, νg = ν, Ψg = Ψ, αg = α). 
Figure 1 illustrates the model investigated in this study. We did not test a second-order H. Holling & J.-T. Kuhn  288 
model here, because with three latent factors, the model is underidentified for multiple-group 
comparisons (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005). 
According to Meredith (1993), strict MI is required for unequivocally ascribing observed 
mean differences to latent mean differences. However, Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthén 
(1989) have argued that releasing selected measurement intercepts still allows for latent 
mean comparisons (cf. Thompson & Green, 2006). In line with these authors, we will call a 
model that holds all factor loadings and residual variances, but only selected measurement 
intercepts fixed across groups a partial strict MI model. We regard strict MI as a desidera-
tum for latent mean comparisons, albeit we assume that comparing latent mean differences 
under partial strict MI is possible. In order to standardize latent mean comparisons, we com-
puted effect sizes of latent mean differences (Hancock, 2001). 
The following indices were used for assessing model fit (abbreviations given in brack-
ets): (1) the Satorra-Bentler χ
2-statistic (SB-χ
2; Satorra & Bentler, 2001); (2) the Compara-
tive Fit Index (CFI); (3) the Bayesian information criterion (BIC); (4) the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA), adjusted for multiple groups; (5) the χ
2-difference test; 
and (6) Steiger’s (1989) gamma hat ( ˆ γ ), as well as McDonald’s (1989) noncentrality index 
(Mc), both of which are sufficiently robust in MI evaluation (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). 
CFI values close to .95 and RMSEA values close to .06 indicate an adequate fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Postulated factor structure of the 12 BIS-HB DT tests. 
V = Verbal DT factor, F = Figural DT factor, N = numerical DT Factor 
 Intellectual giftedness and divergent thinking  289 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics of the 12 DT tests investigated in this study can be found in Table 
2. As can be seen, Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) indicated small to medium standardized mean 
differences between groups with respect to the observed means. However, these results are 
only meaningfully interpretable after MI has been established. 
Except for DT test Masselon, univariate skewness of all DT tests significantly deviated 
from normality. In addition, univariate kurtosis of six DT tests revealed significant departure 
from normality as well. As could be expected, statistical tests indicated the absence of multi-
variate normality (Mardia’s multivariate skewness: b 1,12 = 5.83, A = 1040.47, p < .01; 
Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis: b2,12 = 184.44, Z = 14.67, p < .01). Therefore, all standard 
errors, fit indexes as well as ∆SB-χ
2 were rescaled utilizing the procedure outlined in Satorra 
and Bentler (2001). 
The results of all MI comparisons can be found in Table 3. As can be seen, no significant 
deterioration in model fit occurs up to Model 3, assuming metric MI as well as equal error 
variances. However, strong as well as strict MI were not tenable here (Models 4 and 5, re-
spectively). We therefore investigated the univariate Lagrange multiplier tests (LM) that 
reveal information as to where model misspecification might have occurred. We found that 
the latent intercepts of three DT tests varied across groups, with LM = 17 for divergent com-
puting, LM = 11 for symbol combining and LM = 7 for Masselon. Expected parameter 
change indexes revealed that the latent intercepts in the gifted group were significantly 
higher than for the normal group. Hence, we freed these intercepts and estimated a model 
representing partial strict MI (Model 6), which did not significantly deviate from Model 3. In 
a next step, we compared a model that additionally constrained latent variances and covari-
ances to be equal across groups (Model 7) with the partial strict MI model. No significant 
difference was found, indicating that latent variances as well as covariances can be assumed 
to be equal across groups. In a final step, we compared a model constraining latent means to 
be equal across groups (Model 8) with Model 7, and found a significant deterioration in 
model fit, indicating that the latent means differed significantly between groups. In order to 
quantify these differences, we computed standardized effect sizes (ES; Hancock, 2001) that 
are comparable in meaning to Cohen’s d. ES indicated large latent mean differences in favor 
of the gifted group, ES(verbal) = .69, ES(figural) = .66, ES(numerical) = .50. Hence, gifted 
individuals showed significantly better DT skills. 
Finally, Figure 2 reveals the standardized factor loadings and factor correlations of 
Model 7, where these values are constrained to be equal across the gifted and non-gifted 
group. As can be seen, the latent DT factors correlated substantially, especially the verbal 
and figural DT factor. Figure 2 shows only the latent means of the gifted group because all 
latent means were fixed to zero in the non-gifted group for comparison purposes (cf. Thomp-
son & Green, 2006). 
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Table 2:  
Means, standard deviations and Cohen’s d of DT tests 
 
DT Test  Abbr.  Domain
1 Subsample  d 
     Normal  Gifted   
Symbol completion  ZF  F  5.93 (2.33)  6.66 (2.40)  0.31 
Symbol combining  ZK  F  4.98 (2.17)  5.87 (2.06)  0.42 
Object design  OJ   F  5.68 (2.07)  6.32 (1.96)  0.32 
Layout  LO  F  3.97 (1.56)  4.34 (1.51)  0.24 
Specific traits  EF   V  7.35 (3.60)  8.39 (3.52)  0.29 
Possible object use  AM  V  6.12 (2.87)  7.38 (2.78)  0.45 
Masselon  MA  V  3.79 (1.21)  4.32 (1.28)  0.43 
Insight Test  IT  V  9.62 (3.84)  10.85 (4.04)  0.31 
Puzzles with numbers  ZR   N  4.48 (1.92)  4.67 (1.82)  0.10 
Divergent computing  DR   N  8.66 (3.22)  10.13 (3.37)  0.45 
Equations with numbers  ZG  N  6.62 (2.92)  6.95 (2.74)  0.12 
Inventing telephone numbers  TN  N  9.03 (3.17)  9.53 (3.15)  0.16 
Note. Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
1F = figural, V = verbal, N = numerical. 
 
 
Table 3:  
Fit indices for MI model comparisons across groups 
 
Model EQC
a  df  SB-χ
2 Compare ∆SB-χ
2 CFI BIC  γ ˆ  Mc RMSEA (95 % CI) 
1   102  242.862     .949 56956 0.979 0.94 0.051 
(0.041-0.061) 
2  Λ  111  253.337 2 vs. 1  10.03  .949 56904 0.978 0.94 0.049  
(0.039-0.058) 
3  Λ, Θ  123  265.791 3 vs. 2  9.86  .948 56838 0.978 0.94 0.047  
(0.037-0.056) 
4  Λ, ν  120  298.136 4 vs. 2  43.72
*) .936 56888 0.973 0.92 0.053  
(0.044-0.062) 
5  Λ, Θ, ν  132  309.346 5 vs. 3  42.51
*) .936 56821 0.973 0.92 0.050  
(0.041-0.059) 
6  Λ, Θ, ν
b  129  274.507 6 vs. 3  8.63  .947 56804 0.978 0.93 0.046 
(0.037-0.055) 
7  Λ, Θ, ν
b, Ψ  135  275.427 7 vs. 6  0.92  .949 56764 0.979 0.94 0.044  
(0.035-0.053) 
8  Λ, Θ, ν
b, Ψ, α  138  308.728 8 vs. 7  33.30
*) .938 56779 0.974 0.92 0.048  
(0.040-0.057) 
Note. 
aEquality constraint across groups, 
bintercepts of three DT tests (DR, ZK, MA) were allowed to vary 
across groups. 
*) p < .01. 
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Figure 2:  
Standardized loadings, correlations and latent means of Model 7. 
Latent means are given for the gifted group only (see text) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
As stated in the outline of the paper, conflicting evidence in the literature pertaining to 
the relationship of latent cognitive variables across subgroups have been reported, either in 
support of a lower relationship between cognitive abilities in populations of higher intelli-
gence (Spearman’s law of diminishing returns) or against such an assumption (as in the 
meta-analysis by Kim, 2005). In order to unequivocally assess the relationship of verbal, 
numerical, and figural DT across groups of differing giftedness, we utilized MG-MACS 
models that allow the successive statistical testing of model assumptions. We found that 
concerning DT, the postulated measurement structure of latent abilities remains largely equal 
across groups of differing abilities. That is, with the exception of three latent intercepts, all 
other model parameters (excluding latent means), i.e. factor loadings, error variances, factor 
variances and covariances as well as nine latent intercepts were found to be equal. The do-
main-specific latent structure of DT postulated in this model therefore has been shown to be 
remarkably stable. Further, in contrast to most evidence reported in the literature, we found 
large latent mean differences between the two groups investigated. That is, gifted students 
showed better DT skills in all content domains, especially with respect to verbal DT. A rea-
son for this finding might reside in the fact that the DT tests applied here were administered 
with a time-limit, therefore introducing speededness into the tests, which might have been an 
advantage for the gifted students. However, most psychometric tests need time-limits due to 
administrative reasons. The finding that latent variances were equal for gifted and non-gifted 
samples in this study underlines the fact that DT shows sufficient variability even in gifted 
subjects. 
The fact that latent correlations of DT factors are equal across groups differing in gifted-
ness contrasts the vast literature in support of Spearman’s law of diminishing returns. It 
might be presumed that a reason for this finding resides in the nature of DT as a cognitive H. Holling & J.-T. Kuhn  292 
ability that is less g-loaded than other cognitive tests. For example, in Carroll’s (1993) tax-
onomy of cognitive abilities, the factor representing creativity is assumed to be much less 
dominated by the g factor than a factor representing fluid intelligence. However, other work 
utilizing parcelling strategies (e.g., Süß & Beauducel, 2005) has shown that DT shows sub-
stantial loadings on the g factor. Apparently, DT as operationalized in our study is less vul-
nerable to the law of diminishing returns than cognitive abilities in the domain of fluid intel-
ligence. 
To conclude, we did not find large qualitative differences in latent DT structures between 
differentially gifted groups concerning DT, and gifted students showed significantly better 
DT skills than a normally-gifted comparison group. In order to corroborate our findings 
across different DT tests, additional research is required. 
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